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ABSTRACT
Leveraging 2.5D interposer technology, we advocate the integra-
tion of untrusted commodity components/chiplets with physically
separate, entrusted logic components. Such organization provides a
modern root of trust for secure system-level integration. We show-
case our scheme by utilizing industrial ARM components that are
interconnected via a security-providing active interposer, and thor-
oughly evaluate the achievable security via different threat scenar-
ios. Finally, we provide detailed end-to-end physical design results
to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed methodology.
1 INTRODUCTION
Attackers have traditionally focused on software and their vulner-
abilities (and will also do so in future). Nowadays, tackling the
underlying hardware is also becoming promising for an adver-
sary, e.g., due to “bad decisions” made by designers many years
ago [1]. Besides various works addressing these risks at design- and
manufacture-time, there are many hardware-based countermea-
sures seeking to mitigate security threats at runtime. Among many,
they include enclaves for trusted execution, e.g., ARM TrustZone or
Intel SGX, wrappers for monitoring or cross-checking of third-party
intellectual property (IP) modules [2, 3], centralized security infras-
tructures [4], secure task scheduling [5], and secure architectures
for Networks-on-Chips (NoCs) [6–8].
Considering the ongoing trend for outsourced manufacturing in
the chip industry, there are many steps in the supply chain in which
an adversary can penetrate so as to compromise the security of
electronic circuits [9]. Hardware Trojans [10] or, more broadly, any
malicious modification introduced during IC fabrication represent
serious hazards. Hardware security features and components are
arguably the most vulnerable targets here as adversaries choose
to bypass or disable them, and, to the best of our knowledge, no
prior art has demonstrated that they can withstand malicious mod-
ifications. Besides, before deployment of security-feature-enriched
chips (or any chips), their verification against modifications re-
quires sophisticated solutions (e.g., [11]), not least because physical
verification is difficult in general [12]. In other words, any hardware
security feature itself becomes prone to being stealthily misused,
or circumvented altogether, once the adversaries have access to the
supply chain, particularly during IC manufacturing.1
Irrespective of security-compromising issues in ICs, advanced
packaging and 3D integration technologies have made significant
∗This work was supported by NYUAD REF (Grant RE218) and by NYU/NYUAD CCS.
1Remarkably, this concern may also apply to advanced packaging or 3D integration.
For example, Valamehr et al. [13, 14] propose a security monitor to be 3D-stacked on
top of a commodity processor. Their monitor is based on security features such as
tapping and re-routing, which all rely on introspective interfaces within the commodity
processor and its components. These features may fail or be mislead with false data in
case those interfaces are “hacked” by malicious third parties involved for the design
and/or manufacturing of the commodity chip [14].
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Figure 1: An interposer acting as the security backbone
or “root of trust” for system-level integration of untrusted
chiplets. Any system-level and external communication of
the chiplets is physically enforced to be routed through the
root of trust, where every transaction is monitored and ei-
ther accepted/passed through or denied/blocked.
progress over recent times [15, 16]. This umbrella of diverse tech-
nologies collectively embrace the notion of “building city clusters
or skyscrapers of electronics.” Silicon interposer technology, other-
wise known as “2.5D stacking,” facilitates chip-level integration by
placing die side-by-side; it therefore serves as an integration carrier
and accommodates a specific underlying system-level interconnect
fabric to provide inter-die communication [15–17], resembling a
modern version of a printed circuit board. Building an advanced
electronic system using an interposer is typically less costly and
less complex than native 3D integration [16–18]. In fact, interposer-
based systems are already prominent in the market [19, 20].
Concurrently, there are strong efforts to drive the concept of
design reuse, from IP modules to reusing whole chips at the system
level. In particular, the DARPA CHIPS initiative [21] targets for
common interface standards and system-level integration of chiplets,
i.e., chips encapsulating some, more or less, complex functionality
(e.g., microprocessors) and implementing such standard interfaces.
The notion of chiplet integration has been well-received by the
academia (e.g., [18, 22, 23]) and the industry; related products are
already in the market, e.g., the AMD Epyc chip [20] or the Intel
Embedded Multi-Die Interconnect Bridge technology [24]. Naturally,
advanced packaging and 3D integration technologies are promising
further advancement of such system-level integration of chiplets.
Now, we believe that seizing the opportunities provided by ad-
vanced packaging and 3D integration is timely to, quite literally,
open up a new dimension for the design of secure and trustworthy
electronic systems. This paper can be summarized as follows.
• Drawing help from prominent interposer technology, we
propose a novel concept for a modern “root of trust,” offering
a clear physical separation between commodity and security
components (Sec. 2). We integrate untrusted commodity
chiplets and separate security components (monitoring the
chiplets at runtime), along with a system-level interconnect
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fabric. Towards this end, we make use of an interposer as a
physically separate, trustworthy backbone.
• Our concept does not require any trust assurance for the
commodity chiplets—the chiplets may run malicious code
and/or contain some hardware Trojan(s), all without under-
mining the system-level trustworthiness of our scheme.
• We showcase our concept using industrial components from
ARM, namely the Cortex-M0 chiplet and the Advanced Mi-
crocontroller Bus Architecture High-Performance Bus (AHB),
to implement a secure multi-core system with distributed
shared memories (Sec. 3). Here we also develop dedicated
security features for memory access and data control.
• We thoroughly evaluate our case study (Sec. 4). We imple-
ment different security policies and demonstrate them in
action against malicious runtime behavior (at the simulation
level). We also conduct a full, end-to-end physical design of
our case study, and we elaborate on the acceptable layout
cost of our proposed security scheme.
2 CONCEPT AND THREAT MODEL
Among the various options for advanced packaging and 3D inte-
gration, here we pursue the use of the 2.5D interposer technology.
More specifically, we leverage an interposer as security backbone
(Fig. 1). Such a concept offers some important benefits as follows:
(1) An interposer enables “plug and play integration” of un-
trusted components/chiplets and security modules with a
clear physical separation between those components. As of
now, using an interposer is the sole option for secure system-
level integration of multiple components. Prior schemes fo-
cused on classical 2D integration that cannot tolerate mali-
cious modifications of their security features.
(2) An interposer acting as a security fabric allows us to impose
the policy that any untrusted component has to depend on
this backbone for functionality provision and/or system-level
communication, and not vice versa. Hence, we do not require
any chiplets to provide security assurance, and we also avoid
risking any interference with the security features. Once
adversarial activities are observed by security monitors, the
related communication is blocked directly at the backbone.
Thereby, the system experiences “only” a loss of functionality,
but its integrity and trustworthiness remain intact.
(3) An interesting option is to implement an active interposer
where the integration carrier also contains some logic, not
only passive wiring.2 This way, the security features can
be implemented into the interposer itself, which allows for
dedicated and direct monitoring of all individual chiplets.
Naturally, the fabrication of the interposer has to be trusted—
any risk of malicious modifications cannot be tolerated. Given that
the interposer comprises only the system-level interconnect and
possibly the security features (i.e., when using an active interposer,
as we propose in this work), the design and manufacturing costs
are considered manageable and reasonable.
2Active interposers have been successfully demonstrated in the past [15, 17, 18, 25].
One can simply think of them as regular chips, with relatively large outlines, but
also of relatively simple logic and low utilization rates (thereby managing yield).
Therefore, they may also be implemented using an older technology node. In our
work, alternatively to using an active interposer, the security features can also be
implemented in another chiplet, leveraging a trusted facility for its fabrication. Then,
the system-level interconnect fabric in the passive interposer has to be designed
such that the security chiplet serves as central routing node. This may give rise to
bandwidth limitations; optimizing the interposer interconnect is an active area of
research itself [22, 26, 27].
Threat model: There are various threats to be considered when
seeking to securely integrate components at the system level [2].
In general, all threats concern the system-level communication and
system-level behavior. More specifically, a malicious component
may act as (i) passive reader (snooping), (ii) masquerader (spoofing),
(iii) modifier, and/or (iv) diverter or re-router [2].
Our proposed concept is the first (to our best knowledge) that can
rule out all above threats by construction. As for points (i), (iii), and
(iv), their validity applies as the system-level interconnect fabric is
physically separated from all untrusted components—these compo-
nents cannot access any communication not directly addressed to
or created by them. As for point (ii), we delegate the interconnect
interfaces, which also handle memory addresses, completely to the
security backbone (Sec. 3). In this way, the essence of spoofing, that
is, the malicious modification of source or destination addresses,
cannot be achieved by untrusted components to begin with.
As we implement a multi-chiplet system with shared memories
(Sec. 3), we still have to address the generic threats of malicious
accesses and modifications of memory-resident data carried out at
runtime. Here, we assume that such adversarial behavior is either
introduced by untrusted chiplets, or by some malicious software,
or by some hardware Trojan(s). Any attack is considered to be
exercised through system-level communication targeting the shared
memory. That is, as of now, we do not account for side-channel
based attacks or any Trojans within the memory itself.3
3 ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
Here we describe the functionality and physical design of our pro-
posed interposer-based security-enhanced architecture, dubbed ISEA
for short.4 The interposer acts as the “root of trust,” i.e., it checks the
legitimacy of every requesting communication transaction and ac-
cordingly enforces security policies upon them to protect the entire
system in case of detected malicious activity. Key to our design is
the transaction monitor (TRANSMON) which administers said secu-
rity policies, comprising an address protection unit (APU) and a data
protection unit (DPU). Both the APU and the DPU work in tandem
to collectively serve the establishment of our security-enhancing
policies, as detailed next. We plan to release our proof-of-concept
implementation to the community.
3.1 ISEA-Based System Architecture
Wedescribe the implementation of ISEA in the context of thewidely-
used ARMAMBA on-chip bus architecture. We mote that we exhibit
only a particular instance of ISEA here, as such a security-enhanced
interposer can be retro-fitted to secure other existing (or future)
multi-chiplet architectures as well. We focus on the AMBA Ad-
vanced High Performance Bus (AHB) that serves components which
demand high communication throughput, such as processors and
memories. AHB enables communication among bus-attached mas-
ter components that initiate bus data transfers and bus-attached
slave components that respond to the requests of the masters. The
AHB bus transfers data values, addresses, and control info, managed
by logic components such as arbiters, decoders, multiplexors, etc.,
all of which basically implement the AMBA protocol.
Figure 2 depicts the proposed ISEA architecture. It should be
noted that the AHB and the various proposed security-enhancing
3As for side-channel attacks prior art by Indrusiak et al. [28] suggests randomization
of routing. Such techniques can be readily included in our scheme as well.
4More colloquially, we can also think of and memorize ISEA as “I see (y)a” which
reflects upon the system-level security monitoring enabled by ISEA.
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Figure 2: Overview of ISEA. Blue parts are implemented
exclusively in the “root of trust.” A policy register space
(PRS) holds the security policies relevant for each transac-
tion monitor (TRANSMON). Only the trusted configuration
unit (TCU), via the secure interface (SI), can update the PRS.
constituent components such as the SRS, the SI, and all TRANS-
MONs along with their PRSs, are all implemented exclusively in our
security-enforcing interposer; the functionality and physical im-
plementation details of all these modules will be described shortly
in Section 3.2. Without loss of generality, here we utilize AHB to
interconnect four core chiplets (each comprising 16 ARMM0 cores),
along with four SRAM memory chiplets, nevertheless, as the ar-
chitecture is scalable, any other reasonable number of chiplets and
cores/chiplet can be incorporated into the system to meet the de-
sired computational demands. All core andmemorymodules, which
constitute off-the-shelf plug-in components, are interconnected to
a shared-memory multi-chiplet environment to support distributed
computation where cores are allocated during runtime as defined
by the OS that dictates system-level thread/process scheduling.
All SRAM modules (i.e., slaves) occupy the entire memory space,
with each being distributed a subset of the memory map, where
communication transactions are implemented as reads or writes to
specific memory locations. Chiplets (i.e., masters) request access to
the bus in order to load/store data from/to the shared memory.
3.1.1 Transaction Monitor (TRANSMON). Key to our design is
the TRANSMON (Fig. 3), with one placed in-between every slave
component and the AHB bus interface.5 This serves to continuously
check upon the legitimacy of every transaction by the TRANSMON
attached to the specific SRAM that contains the memory addresses
upon which read or write accesses are requested, after such trans-
actions successfully complete AHB arbitration and routing.
A TRANSMON blocks transaction requests that either (a) do not
possess the permissions to access shared memory regions, as dic-
tated by the APU, or (b), are not allowed to write out specific data,
as determined by the DPU; by default, TRANSMON also blocks
any request that cannot be matched to some policy. Also note that
all policies involve the handling of master/slave IDs. Since the
TRANSMON-AHB interfaces are all implemented in the interposer,
there cannot be any spoofing of IDs to begin with. Hence, the APU
protects against any undefined and/or malicious access while the
DPU protects against any illegal data modification or leakage. In
case a request is denied, the TRANSMON passes an error mes-
sage to the chiplet (master) which initiated the transaction, while
the memory access is simply dropped (by the Slave Access Filter),
thereby protecting the data.
5Another option would be to place the TRANSMONs between the master components
and the AHB bus. However, our design decision offers two important benefits. First, a
TRANSMON at the master would require additional address decoding, which is already
covered by AHB itself. Second, a TRANSMON at the slave allows to keep track of only
the policies relevant to that slave. As a result, for our architecture, the hardware cost
and delays imposed by policy checking are restricted.
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Figure 3: Zoom-in of the TRANSMON features.
A TRANSMON comprises an APU, a DPU, and some glue logic.
Both the APU and DPU have their own policy register space (PRS).
For efficiency, the PRSs are implemented using flip-flops. Each
PRS entry defines an individual policy concerning either (a) some
particular region in the shared memory space, physically allocated
in the related memory slave connected to that TRANSMON, or
(b) some particular data. The PRSs are initialized from the trusted
configuration unit (TCU) which has privileged access to the AHB
via the secure interface (SI). The TCU is required for other system-
level steps, namely the scheduling of the multi-core application, the
loading of the initial data into the shared memories, the compilation
of all required policies, as well as sending the interrupt/request to
start the computation. Note that the TCU can be provided either
by an external, trusted entity or it can also be realized by a fully
trusted processor directly stacked onto the interposer.
3.1.2 Address Protection Unit (APU). The APU forms an essen-
tial part of the TRANSMON and for the proposed ISEA architecture.
As such, it is also to be implemented in the interposer “root of trust.”
Each APU makes use of its own PRS, which is also embedded in
the interposer. The function of the APU is to control any chiplet
requests against specific memory ranges. The control covers the
type of access (i.e., whether it is read-only, write-only, or read/write)
and the actual address or address range. A simple 2-bit encoding is
used for read/write access, with “01” for read-only (RO), “10” for
write-only (WO) and “11” for read/write (RW) (“00” is reserved).
For address ranges, address masking is leveraged.
As Fig. 3 shows, an APU policy comprises four parameters: (1)
Master ID (APUMID), which identifies the master chiplet which
initiates a memory request; (2) a 32-bit address (APUADDR); (3) a
32-bit address mask (APUMASK), where the transaction is valid
only if HADDR if greater than APUADDR logically bit-wise ANDed
with APUMASK, where HADDR is calculated as the logical OR-
ing of APUADDR with APUMASK; (4) the read/write permission
(APUPERM), i.e., whether RO, WO, or RW.
3.1.3 Data Protection Unit (DPU). The DPU, like the APU, forms
an essential part of the TRANSMON. Its function is to provide data-
level protection in the multi-chiplet ISEA system. This is achieved
by blocking (a) overwriting of data in the event of unauthorized
writes to specific memory locations, or (b) writing out particular
data. The former serves protection of data at runtime, and the
latter serves protection of assets, e.g., secret keys, from leaking into
the shared memory. Superficially, a transaction is not allowed to
proceed when the DPU PRS contains a policy that disables writing
of particular data to some address range. Note that the DPU incurs
one cycle delay in all the write transaction to the slave, as the DPU
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checks can only work during the data phase of the AHB protocol.
Hence, until the data is checked, address and control signals are
registered and kept.
As Fig. 3 shows, a DPU policy comprises five parameters: (1)
Master ID (DPUMID); (2) a 32-bit DPU address (DPUADDR); (3)
a 32-bit restricted-write data value (DPUDATA); (4) a 32-bit data
mask (DPUDMASK), which serves to block the transaction in the
event that the logical ANDING of HWDATA with the bit-wise
inversion of DPUDMASK equals to DPUDATA; (5) a 32-bit address
mask (DPUAMASK), with the working mechanism as in the APU.
3.2 Physical Design
Here, we elaborate on our end-to-end flow of our proposed interposer-
based multi-chiplet design. The physical design flow encompasses
two major steps, next discussed in detail.
Design Partitioning and Floorplanning:We partition ISEA’s
full chip netlist into multiple chiplets of core/memory banks, where
a core (memory) bank contains multiple processor cores (memories),
the size of which are set by the user. As indicated earlier, for our
proof-of-concept design we implement 4 core (master) banks, each
comprising 16 ARM-Cortex M0 cores, and 4 memory (slave) banks,
each containing 16 64KB memories. In our flow, the designer has
the freedom to specify the size of the core and memory banks, the
starting utilization, and the aspect ratio individually, which is all
passed to the floorplanning procedure. Essentially, the floorplanning
matrix appears in the following order: {{MB MB} {CB CB CB CB}
{MBMB}}, where MB stands for memory bank and CB for core bank;
Figure 5 shows this arrangement. The floorplanning also generates
placement information for the memory blocks in the MBs which
are used for the 2D memory implementation based upon designer
inputs concerning the horizontal and vertical spacing between
memories. The floorplan information is saved in TCL format and
then utilized in the 2D implementation of the chiplets, including
the interposer. Chiplet netlists are then generated, timing budgets
are derived, and, finally, chiplet constraints are calculated.
We place emphasis on the fact that the physical design flow is flex-
ible concerning the chiplets being designed in-house or procured
as hard IP. For hard-IP chiplets, the steps are more straightforward,
and essentially covering the interposer design. That is, the designer
has no freedom in modifying the size of the chiplet.
Planning of Interposer Microbumps and Design Closure:
If not procured as hard IP, individual chiplets proceed through
the standard 2D implementation flow which generates individu-
ally routed layouts with microbump locations. For the interposer
microbumps, their locations are chosen around the vicinity of dri-
vers/sinks. On-track legalization is performed for the interposer
microbumps via custom scripts; the objective here is to maximize
the utilization of routing resources. RC parasitics are generated
from the postRouted, final layout in SPEF format. This file is then
used for sign-off analysis, i.e., to evaluate power and performance.
Once the 2D implementation for all chiplets is done, or imme-
diately in case the chiplets are hard IP, the interposer P&R flows
follows. First, the interposer netlist—essentially containing ISEA—
is imported along with the microbump locations derived from all
chiplets. After completing the regular design flow of the interposer
and exporting the final netlist, we extract the final RC parasitics and
stream out the respective GDS. To evaluate ISEA’s chip-wide PPA,
a wrapper netlist is generated for the interposer and all the chiplets.
The interposer microbump parasitics are modelled into the SPEF of
the wrapper. We do not engage in any inter-tier cross-optimization;
again, that is essential to accommodate for hard-IP chiplets.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Experimental setup:We implement ISEA end-to-end for a 64-core
multi-chip system usingARM M0 cores, showcasing the practicality
of our work. The 64 cores are organized into four chiplets, each
holding 16 cores; we also employ four memory chiplets with 1 MB
SRAM for each. We emphasize that this implementation constitutes
a proof-of-concept; in reality, larger memory chiplets and more
complex cores are likely to be utilized. The Register Transfer Level
(RTL) code for the complete system including the TM, bus matrix
etc., have been implemented using Verilog. Verification has been
performed using Synopsys VCS, whileARM’s IARworkbench is used
to generate the processor program codes. Synthesis was performed
using Synopsys DC and layout generation using Cadence Innovus
v.17.10. We leverage the 65 nm Global Foundries technology and
ARM standard cell and memory libraries. We also utilize the Synop-
sys SAED 90 nm technology to synthesize a second version of the
interposer. We utilize 7 and 4 metal layers for core and interposer
respectively, for both 65 and 90 nm technologies.
4.1 Security Evaluation
Fig. 4 illustrates the simulated behavior of ISEA. We next outline
the threat scenarios and related ISEA configurations, where for all
such scenarios ISEA successfully blocks all malicious transactions.
A malicious core tries to read/write some memory region previ-
ously declared as protected. The related policy is concerning the
address space; the APU covers this kind of threat. Waveform 4(a)
shows how address protection policies help in blocking a transac-
tion addressed to a protected region. An APU policy is set for the
processor with ID 0x1, restricting its access by limiting it to the
address range: 0x2000_0000 (APUADDR AND NOT(APUMASK))
to 0x2000_7FFF (APUADDR OR APUMASK). Any access outside
this region will not be passed to the memory but, instead, an Error
Response (hresp) is returned to the master processor. Waveform 4(a)
shows the Error Response generated for the address 0x2000_F800
as it is outside the allowed range.
A malicious core tries to write out some sensitive asset, e.g.,
a secret crypto key. The related policy is concerning the actual
data; the DPU covers this kind of threat. In Waveform 4(b), a DPU
policy is set to track a write transaction by the master processor
with ID 0x1 to the memory region between addresses 0x2000_0000
(DPUADDR AND NOT(DPUAMASK)) to 0x2FFF_FFFF (DPUADDR
OR DPUAMASK) for the sensitive data 0x0BAD_BEEF (DPUDATA
AND NOT(DPUMASK)). The waveform also shows an attempt to
write the restricted data value, which results in an Error Response
generated by the DPU.
Two (or more) cores run the same computation in parallel, e.g.,
for cross-checking. Then, one malicious core tries to (a) access the
result of some other core, stored in the shared memory, and (b)
possibly corrupt the other’s result, to hide own malicious results
from cross-checking. The related policy is concerning the address
space. Here the policy needs to be formulated such that access to
the storage address of the other master is restricted. Waveform 4(c)
shows that the policy is formulated for the master ID 0x2 such that
it has access to address ranges from 0x4002_0000 (APUADDR[1]
ANDNOT(APUMASK[1])) to 0x4002_006C (APUADDR[1] ORAPU-
MASK[1]) and address ranges from 0x4002_0074 (APUADDR[2]
ANDNOT(APUMASK[2])) to 0x4002_0FFF (APUADDR[2] OR APU-
MASK[2]), but not to the address 0x4002_0070, that is, where the
master ID 0x1 stores its result. As covered in the waveform, with
this setting of APU policies, when the master ID 0x2 tries to access
4
Table 1: PPA results for different chip versions. C denotes
chiplet and I denotes interposer.
Chip Version Cell Count (C/I) Cell Area (C/I) Delay (ns) Power (mW)
Non-secure 491,036/103,857 23,832,291/371,115 10.5 347
Secure (Interposer 65nm) 505,019/195,921 23,961,873/854,899 12.628 396
Secure (Interposer 90nm) 505,019/177,194 23,961,873/2,284,187 17.170 450
the address 0x4002_0070, the transaction is blocked by the APU,
and an Error Response is returned.
Two (or more) cores are establishing a semaphore for software-
based access control of shared memory regions. Semaphores can
be stored in the additional shared register space (SRS) which is part
of the “root of trust,” hence trustworthy by itself. Here, a malicious
core tries to over-write the semaphore to be able to read/corrupt
shared memory otherwise not accessible. Hence, the related pol-
icy is concerning data access. Waveform 4(d) shows how such a
transaction is blocked. gpcfg39_reg is considered as a semaphore
register here. For the processor master with ID 0x1, to obtain the
ownership of semaphore, it has to write 0x0000_0001 to the above
register, but can do so only while the register value is 0x0000_0000.
For master ID 0x2, it similarly has to write 0x0000_0010 to obtain
the semaphore. Naturally, one master should not be able to clear the
bit set by any other master. A DPU policy is compiled to implement
this data restriction. In the waveform, the DPU policy is set for
the master ID 0x02 to restrict writing of “0” to the last bit (DPU-
DATA AND NOT(DPUMASK)) of the semaphore register. Then, the
waveform shows an attempt to clear the last bit of the semaphore
register by the master ID 0x2, resulting in the error response.
4.2 Layout Evaluation
We analyze and compare the PPA for three versions of the chip
which include the non-secure version and two secure versions. We
implement the interposers at two different technology nodes, at
65nm and 90nm respectively. Table 1 provides chiplet and inter-
poser cell count and standard cell area contribution separately as
C/I. The power and delay overheads, when comparing the imple-
mentations (of secure and non-secure) at 65nm are 14.1% and 20.2%
respectively. The timing and power overheads between the inter-
poser implementation at 65nm and 90nm is roughly 36% and 13.6%
which is reflective of technology scaling [29]. Please note that area
overhead in the interposer does not induce any additional silicon
cost as the die area remains the same.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We propose and demonstrate a security concept providing clear
physical separation at the system level. Our architecture, referred
to as ISEA, is based on the 2.5D technology, where, by leveraging an
interposer as the secure entity, we enable trusted system-level inte-
gration of untrusted chiplets. We propose different features within
ISEA which protect against malicious data and address transactions.
As a proof-of-concept, we implement ISEA for a 64-core ARM M0
system and also explore physical design implementation for various
foundry scenarios. More specifically, we leverage 65nm and 90nm
libraries by Globalfoundries and Synopsys. Using an interposer is
the only option to cost-effectively “mix-and-match” chiplets and
technologies from different vendors and foundries—all while main-
taining trust, as we have shown here. We consider various threats
and demonstrate related policies in action; ISEA can successfully
act as “police” to enforce system-level security.
As for future work, we note that other schemes like multi-party
computation (MPC) inherently require a system-level security back-
bone. Hence, we shall also apply our scheme towards MPC. Cur-
rently, our scheme protects against communication-level threats.
However, we envision the interposer as a general security platform,
which can be augmented with various sensors as well. This way,
we shall seek to identify malicious activities which are expressed
by side-channels, but not detectable by security policies.
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(a) Malicious read access blocked by an APU policy. (b) Malicious write-out of a secret key 0XBAD_BEEF blocked by a DPU policy.
(c) Malicious manipulation of data blocked by an APU policy. (d) Malicious over-writing of a semaphore in gpcfg39_reg blocked by a DPU policy.
Figure 4: Demonstration of ISEA at simulation level, obtained from Synopsys VCS.
(a) Floorplan of ISEA. 4 ARM chiplets in the middle,
4 memory cores around. Inset: Microbumps in yellow
for the interposer.
(b) ARM M0 chiplet (16 cores). Logic and mi-
crobump locations (top), routing (bottom).
(c) ISEA implementation in interposer. TRANSMON
in white, regular AHB components in grey. Inset:
Routing across four metal layers.
Figure 5: Layout snapshots, obtained from Cadence Innovus.
6
